Introduction............................................................................. Clifford Sather 45
The Sultanate of Sulu: Problems in the Analysis of a
Segmentary State........................................................................... Thomas M. Kiefer 46
The Sultanate of Kutai, Kalimantan-Timur: A Sketch of the
Traditional Political Structure...................................................... J. R. Wortmann 51
Brunei and the Bajau...................................................................... D. E. Brown 55
Sulu's Political Jurisdiction Over the Bajau Laut......................... Clifford Sather 58
The Political Situation in Sabah on the Eve of Chartered
Company Rule................................................................................ I. D. Black 62
Some Notes on Sociopolitical Change Among the Jama Mapun.... Eric Cassino 65
Bibliography.................................................................................. 66

Brief Communications

Cooperation and Development Among the Bidayuh.................... Bouwe G. Grijpstra 67
Formation of the Sumatra Research Council and the Founding
of the Berita Kadjian Sumatera (Sumatra Research Bulletin)........ M. A. Jaspan 69
Research into the Social Structure and Belief Systems of
the Iban and Related Peoples of West Kalimantan....................... Victor T. King 70
Research on the Tarsier in Borneo............................................. Tom Harrisson 71

Announcements

Rousseau to Edit a Special Issue of the SMJ................................. 71
Information Wanted on Recent Research Among the Punan and
Bukat............................................................................................ 72
Request for Information on Ethnic Groups in Borneo, Their
Distribution, and Demographic Status.......................................... 72
SPECIAL REPORTS SERIES of the Center for Southeast Asian
Studies, Northern Illinois University............................................ 72
Monograph on the Muslim Filipinos in Preparation........................ 73
South-East Asian Journal of Sociology.......................................... 74

The Borneo Research Bulletin is published twice yearly (June and
December) by the Borneo Research Council. Please address all
inquiries and contributions for publication to G. N. Appell,
Editor, Borneo Research Bulletin, Phillips, Maine 04966, U.S.A.
Single issues are available at US$2.50.
The Borneo Research Council was founded in 1968 and is composed of an international group of scholars engaged in research in Borneo. The goals of the Council are (1) to promote scientific research in the social, biological, and medical sciences in Borneo; (2) to permit the research community, interested Borneo government departments, and others to keep abreast of ongoing research and its results; (3) to serve as a vehicle for drawing attention to urgent research problems; (4) to coordinate the flow of information on Borneo research arising from many diverse sources; (5) to disseminate rapidly the initial results of research activity; and (6) to facilitate research by reporting on current conditions. The functions of the Council also include providing counsel and assistance to research endeavors, conservation activities, and the practical application of research results.

The Council is governed by a Board of Directors whose members are: G. N. Appell (Brandeis University); S. S. Bedlington (Cornell University); Donald E. Brown (University of California, Santa Barbara); F. L. Dunn (University of California, San Francisco Medical Center); Tom Harrisson (University of Sussex); David A. Horr (Brandeis University); Alfred B. Hudson (University of Massachusetts); Robert F. Inger (Field Museum of Natural History); H. S. Morris (London School of Economics); D. J. Prentice (Australian National University); Benedict Sandin (Sarawak Museum); C. A. Sather (Vassar College); P. M. Shariffudin (Brunei Museum); Herbert Whittier (Michigan State University).

Support for the activities of the Council come from subscriptions to the Borneo Research Bulletin, Fellowship fees, and contributions. Contributions have played a significant part in the support of the Council, and they are always welcome.

Fellows of the Borneo Research Council

The Council consists of Fellows who are professionally engaged in research in Borneo. There are currently 132 Fellows from the following disciplines: Agricultural Economics; Agricultural Sciences; Animal Ecology; Anthropology; Archaeology; Biology; Botany; Conservation; Cultural Anthropology; Ecology; Economic Development; Ethnomusicology; Geography; Geology; History; History (Continued to Page 80)
INTRODUCTION

Clifford Sather

The following papers are the first in a continuing series of "Special Issues" intended to bring together the results of recent or ongoing research as they relate to topics of general interest.

The topic here is the traditional political structure of the indigenous coastal states of Brunei, Sulu, and Kutai, and their relations with the ethnic groups and the regional and local communities in Borneo and the southern Philippines over which they claimed jurisdiction.

The structures and relations dealt with are complex, and they link local communities and groups in a wider political framework marked by the presence of the state. Here, as elsewhere, the term "state" implies the existence of specialized office-holders, territorial sovereignty, and a hierarchical order exercising some control over the use of force within the area over which sovereignty is claimed (cf. Nadel 1942:49). It is clear that states predate European--and even Islamic--penetration of the Borneo-Philippine area, but little is known of their origins or early development. For later times, a great deal of comparative work is needed to isolate and account for structural differences. There are also apparent similarities that require attention. In the first paper that follows Thomas Kiefer applies the concept of a "segmentary state" to an analysis of the Sulu Sultanate. While particularly appropriate to Sulu, the concept appears more generally applicable, perhaps, to all Borneo-Philippine states. Basically a segmentary state is one in which the territorial sovereignty of the center is recognized but shades off to ritual hegemony at its margins (cf. Southall n.d.). While a centralized government exists, the peripheral units of the state enjoy considerable autonomy and may, as in the case of Sulu, exercise power independently. In my own paper I try to show the consequences of this shading off of effective authority in terms of Sulu's jurisdictional control over the Bajau Laut. Not only is control over groups in the peripheral units of the state weak, but such groups may readily secede and shift allegiance from one state to another. Donald Brown examines one such shift, by the Bajau from Brunei to Sulu, and raises the question of what effect the different sociopolitical structures of the two sultanates may have had in bringing this shift about and, more generally, on Brunei's subsequent decline and Sulu's rise to power in the face of European contact and altering trade patterns.

In addition to the reports on the Sulu and Brunei Sultanates, the Sultanate of Kutai is described by J. R. Wortmann. I. D. Black assesses the political situation in Sabah immediately prior to
Chartered Company rule and notes that on the coast the comparative failure of Brunei, and the success of Sulu, in shaping local political institutions and values appears, again, related to their different sociopolitical structures. The final paper by Eric Casiano deals with the Jama Mapun, another "Bajau" group formerly under Sulu's hegemony, and takes up the problem of sociopolitical change.

THE SULTANATE OF SULU: PROBLEMS IN THE ANALYSIS OF A SEGMENTARY STATE

Thomas M. Kiefer*

A full description of the Sultanate of Sulu is obviously not possible in the short space of this article. Furthermore, while the sultanate still exists in greatly modified form, a scholarly reconstruction of the Tausug polity as it existed during its heyday in the middle of the 18th century is probably not possible. However, by the middle of the 19th century, although there is evidence of some "decline," we are on much firmer ground. An analysis of the state at that time would necessarily have to take into account several types of facts: 1) travelers' accounts and other historical sources; 2) present indigenous Tausug political organization on the level of the minimal and medial alliance; 3) the contemporary operation of the sultanate; 4) accounts of the sultanate given by older informants; and 5) comparative analysis of similar institutions in other parts of greater Indonesia. Rather than attempt the impossible in this brief contribution, I will rather describe where my research is leading me and identify some of the crucial issues—both ethnographic and theoretical—which have emerged since my return from Jolo in 1968.

The Problem of Structural Variability

The ethnographer gets an immediate impression of considerable cultural uniformity among the several hundred thousand Tausug in Sulu. Cultural (i.e., symbolic and valuatinal) variation is limited to a few items of minor importance, and the Tausug certainly have a self-image of themselves as a unified people. On the other hand, the social structure (the way society seems organized "on the ground") seems to display great variation in both space and time, depending on how local configurations of power, authority, and group membership operate in specific instances.

* Thomas M. Kiefer is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Brown University. Dr. Kiefer's research in Jolo was done in 1966-68, with a brief return visit during the summer of 1971. His principal publications are listed at the end of this collection of papers.
Based on Geertz's analysis of Balinese village organization, I have identified six principles of affiliation in terms of which individuals can be attached to groups: 1) an estate system of division into aristocrats (datu), commoners, and slaves; 2) a bilateral kinship system (with some patrilineal tendencies of Islamic origin) of nuclear families and kindreds extending effectively out to second cousins; 3) a territorial system of local group identification based not upon boundaries but rather upon the vague space which surrounds a center point; 4) a system of rapidly changing segmentary factions based on friendship and kinship; 5) a system of appointed titles given by the sultan which give legitimacy to political and juridical authorities; and 6) a system of mosques. Membership in groups formed on one principle of affiliation does not necessarily coincide with membership in groups formed on any other. The result is a society with a good deal of criss-crossing loyalties in which the possibility of permanent rifts is very slight in spite of constant endemic feuding, factionalism, and other conflict. This fact has led me to emphasize the structural importance of conflict in unifying the Tausug state. It was a state which drew its life-blood from internal conflict and tended to define its functions in strictly legalistic terms.

The Minimal Importance of Kinship in the Polity

While I do not wish to deny the importance of kinship in the conduct of local-level politics, the Tausug polity as a whole was not heavily patterned in terms of kinship obligations. This was partially the result of the influence of conscious Islamic models and partially the result of the considerable importance given to friendship and alliance. Kinship was only one means in terms of which an alliance could be constructed, and in any event there was always a choice among a number of possible kinsmen-allies. Friendship (both institutionalized and informal) was the cement which bound the polity together in a complex network of ramified alliances. Perhaps I have read Evans-Pritchard too well, for I have attempted--somewhat arbitrarily--to deal with levels in the alliance structure in terms of concepts like "minimal," "medial," and "maximal." Another model might be preferable, but I have yet to find one.

The Lack of Corporate Structure

This is a feature to which I have given great importance. The Tausug define groups in terms of their center (usually the leader), not the vague boundaries which may overlap those of another group. In terms of the several characteristics of corporate groups, Tausug rank rather low indeed. Now the problem with all this for a political anthropologist is that superficially there does not seem to be much formal structure in the Tausug polity; it is "loosely structured" if you will. There are obvious problems with such a negative concept, but the idea of political structure has been so heavily influenced by the corporate model that we lack the tools to deal with polities which do not operate with corporations.
The Segmentary Model

The Tausug state fits the model of a segmentary state as described by Southall (n.d.) and others rather nicely. There is no functional differentiation of the various sub-units of the polity. There is centralized government represented by the sultanate, but there are peripheral points over which the center has little control. Territorial sovereignty is recognized, but it is much stronger at the center than at the edges, shading off into mere ritual hegemony in the more remote areas. The most important point, however, is that central and peripheral authorities are mirror images of each other; both have the same rights and duties--albeit differing in extent--vis-à-vis the political system. In one sense the sultan could be regarded as being a very powerful headman, while the local headman could also be regarded as being a very petty sultan. (There were, however, a few ritual functions which belonged only to the sultan.) In a forthcoming publication (Kiefer 1972) I have identified the major rights and duties belonging to political office among the Tausug: rights to perform legal functions, rights to appoint religious officials, rights to control over territory, rights to control over subject peoples, rights to wage external war, rights to tribute and legal fees, rights to control over markets, and rights to mediate private warfare. The key feature of Tausug political organization was that there was no clear-cut (that is, "rationalized") way of parceling out these various rights at different levels of the political system. A leader tried to extend his own rights as far as he could until he conflicted with the rights asserted by others. For example, political authorities were traditionally given a right to control markets within their domain and collect a tariff (usually 10%) of gross revenue. The local headman did this within his own territory vis-a-vis the small coastal markets, while the sultan did so vis-a-vis trade with Chinese and Europeans, in which Jolo island as a whole could be considered one vast market for the collection of certain products (mother-of-pearl, trepang, birds-nests, etc.). The model for acceptable conduct was exactly the same in both cases; so much so that powerful headmen could on occasion take some of the sultan's traditional rights.

The segmentary model helps to make sense of the Tausug polity if we are interested in gross typology. While the model does imply certain features of political process, it is obviously much easier to reconstruct the formal structure of the Sulu sultanate than to deal with process. All I can do is to describe political process as it is occurring today, and infer that it operated in approximately the same way in the past.

Tarling's "Breakdown" Theory

Nicholas Tarling (1963) and others have argued that the expansion of European trade in the Malay area in the late 18th century took away the economic foundations of the indigenous coastal states, thus weakening the sultanates and allowing for the development of piracy. While I do not control the historical data on this question
with any competence, I nevertheless have some suspicions about the conclusion. In the first place, as Reber (1966) has demonstrated, there is a historiographical problem involving the biases introduced into the record by British colonialists in the early 19th century who saw "piracy" as sufficient justification for intervention and conquest. In the second place, there is not much evidence that European expansion had cut very far into the Sulu trade with China until the early part of the 19th century, even assuming that such trade was the only basis for the Tausug state (which I doubt). In the third place, there is precious little evidence concerning Tausug political institutions in the middle of the 18th century which would serve as a basis for comparison with the 19th century. In the fourth place, it overrates the influence a handful of Europeans could have on a fully functioning political system embracing several hundred thousand persons in Sulu. In the fifth place, it tends to view the presence of random internal violence as evidence for weakness of political organization, a common assumption in Western political thought. The matter is by no means settled, however, and I am willing to admit that European expansion must have had some early effect on the native states. But to what extent?

The Problem of the "Ruma Bichara"

Donald Brown and I have discussed this problem at length for Brunei. In the traditional state there was an advisory council to the sultan called the duma bissara in Tausug, composed of influential datus and other advisers. Professor Majul (1965a) has maintained that this was a decision-making council with a fixed membership, and a system of voting in which the sultan and the raja muda had two votes. The difficulty with this interpretation with respect to the Tausug is that it is out of character with their culture: if it was a fully corporate group with bounded membership it would be the only such group in Tausug society, and voting as a political procedure was hardly present prior to the American conquest. There is, however, the intriguing possibility that duma bissara (which literally means "to bring speech" in Tausug) is a folk etymology based upon the Malay rumah bichara (house of speech). The Malay term emphasizes a fixed corporate institution while the Tausug term is a verb emphasizing the process of bringing speech (i.e., advice) to the sultan. At present I am confused about all this.

The History of Islamization

For many years the study of the Islamic history in Southeast Asia has been straddled with a missionary-oriented view of religion in which "conversion" is an all or nothing affair. Exactly when Islam "came" to Sulu seems to me to be a rather meaningless question, although I suppose it is possible to identify a time when Islamic influences began to be felt, give or take fifty years in either direction. I am more concerned with what seems to be some evidence that real sophistication in Islam (sophistication is a relative matter; the Tausug are probably better Moslems in the orthodox sense than any other Moslem group in the Philippines) was only achieved in the 19th century. Dalrymple in the middle of the 18th
century mentions that he exchanged friendship with the sultan, sharing blood with him, a practice which is strongly condemned today in terms of an Islamic ethic (although it very occasionally occurs). The fact that it was done by the sultan himself in the 18th century suggests considerable change. Other writers have noted the Tausug fondness for alcoholic beverages in the early 19th century, yet rural Tausug are very strict on this matter today. I would be interested in learning what evidence from other parts of northeast Indonesia would suggest a similar change in Islamic values.

Indigenous vs. Islamic Elements in the State

Further research is needed to determine which features of the traditional state are actually based on Islamic models and which features are purely local developments. This is not an easy task, first because Islam presents a variety of historical configurations, and secondly because a good bit of Tausug political culture has passed through a Malay filter.

The Ideal State vs. the Actual State

The difference between real and ideal is obviously found to some extent in all political systems, but it is especially acute among the Tausug. This is almost entirely the result of an enormous tour de force in which Islamic ideals emphasizing the centralized autocratic state are squared with a social structure which makes such a state impossible. A great gap between real and ideal seems quite typical of almost all Islamic societies, and the Tausug are no exception. I have yet to really answer the question as to how the ideals can be maintained in spite of the reality, and what functions this maintenance serves.

The Meaning of Violence

I have been very concerned with the problem of violence in Tausug life primarily because it is the sine qua non of the modern nation state and Western political thought is obsessed with it. Actually, there is no adequate Tausug word or concept comparable to "violence." While Weber's definition of the state as an institution aiming at a monopoly of violence within a territory is less influential now than it has been in the past—partially because it makes less sense in the post World War II world than it did when Weber was alive—it is still very much with us. There are two questions here for the analysis of the Tausug state: How could the state persist in spite of endemic conflict, and what was the relation of the Tausug state to the control of violence?

With respect to the first, I have tried to show that endemic violence is not "disruptive" once we take into account that the
Tausug consider the conflict-regulating functions of the state to be ends rather than means to the achievement of other ends. With respect to the second question I have tended to fall back on rather hazy culture and personality explanations to deal with the larger issue of violence in relation to the state. I have emphasized the importance of violence as a means of sustaining a certain valued life style, aesthetically pleasing to the Tausug, however morally wrong it may be in the eyes of God. In a future publication I intend to discuss what I detect to be a strain of philosophical anarchism in Tausug culture; a refusal to distinguish clearly (as we do) between illegitimate violence and legitimate force. All violence toward fellow Tausug is morally wrong in a religious context, however aesthetically pleasing it may be to the individual's sense of self. For example, there is recognition that headmen may occasionally have to traffic in violence, and it would be personally shameful if they did not, but at the same time it is said that headmen have a much greater chance of suffering in hell because of their "legitimate" activities.

The primary ethnographic problem in this regard is to describe the startling contrast between ideal religious morality on the one hand and everyday behavior on the other. The contrast between the man of piety and the man of violent action is crucial to Tausug culture. I have yet to work out all its ramifications for the understanding of the political system.

THE SULTANATE OF KUTAI, KALIMANTAN-TIMUR:
A SKETCH OF THE TRADITIONAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE

J. R. Wortmann*

Until the arrival in 1846 of H. von Dewall, the first Dutch civil administrator on the east coast of Borneo, political and economic power in Kutai was in the hands of the sultan and his immediate family.

This power was exercised principally along the Mahakam River and its branches. The jurisdiction of the sultan ceased officially at Gunung Sendawar, a small hill, which plays a prominent role in the legend concerning the origins of the dynastic house of Kutai and is located between Melak and Long Iram on the Mahakam. The sultan was forbidden to travel beyond Gunung Sendawar, a prohibition never formally transgressed. Nevertheless, disregarding the spirit of

* J. R. Wortmann is a member of the Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology (Leiden) and is currently at work on a study of the history and socioeconomic relations of the Sultanate of Kutai during the period of Dutch administration. Mr. Wortmann resided at Balikpapan between 1947 and 1950, as a member of the Dutch Expeditionary Forces, at which time he established a postal service in Kutai.
this prohibition, sultans at different times and with varying success tried to achieve control over the region of the Upper-Mahakam. Just as his predecessors had done, Sultan Mohammed Soleiman, for example, attempted in 1899 to lure the chief of the Kayans of the Upper-Mahakam, named Kwing Irang, to Tenggarong in order to extract from him an oath of fealty. Dr. A. W. Nieuwenhuis, then traveling through the region on a mission for the Dutch government, was able to prevent this. Because of the geographic barrier to upriver travel presented by rapids, the reluctance of the joint Bahau and Modang tribes in the region, and subsequently the opposition of the Netherlands-Indian government (in 1908 the region was placed directly under Dutch rule) the actual influence of the sultans here was negligible.

The power of the sultans was of an economic rather than political or religious nature and was founded on the tollbridge. At Tenggarong on the Mahakam the sultans had their residence and their river-toll, where duties were imposed on all incoming and outgoing merchandise. The revenues from this taxation, until the arrival of the Dutch, accrued to the sole benefit of the sultan and his family. His subjects received no portion of them nor did they go to support any kind of community welfare institutions.

Other sources of income enjoyed by the sultan were taxes on the preparation and export of opium and salt and on gambling. In 1900 the sultan ceded the right to impose these taxes to the Dutch government in exchange for a yearly sum of 105,000 guilders. This arrangement enabled the Dutch virtually to destroy the economic domination of the sultan over his subjects. At the same time the Dutch authorities acknowledged the position of the sultan, who now more than previously was responsible for administrative affairs. The sultan was assisted in the performance of his duties by four or five manteri-negri (great officers of state), with whom he sat in the bali (council chamber) for bidjarra [consultations]. The manteri-negri held the title of pangeran, which in Kutai was an appointive rather than hereditary title. Originally, the sultan himself was the highest judge in the questions of religion. In 1924 he delegated this task to the manteri-negri Pangeran Sosro Negoro, who then became Hakim Mahakamah Islam and judicated over religious cases, assisted by several other council members.

Because of the sultan's many wives and concubines, the royal family tended to grow large in time and the matter of its financial support became an acute problem. Many of the sultan's relatives were directly supported by the sultan himself. Others established themselves and their followers further from the river and employed their time with feuding, gambling, and terrorizing the local population. The sultan, even had he been so inclined, was powerless to put an end to this chaotic situation, because he was generally unable to enforce his rule far from Tenggarong.

The worst abuses subsided or disappeared in 1900 with the arrival of the civil administrator Barth. The sultans were more than
willing to allow the Dutch to look after the country's interests in as far as their activities did not directly affect them. And the Dutch in turn were not reluctant to take over all sorts of tasks thus greatly increasing their hold on the region. The real power was now in the hands of the Dutch although the sultanate remained technically autonomous and was nominally governed by the sultan and his manteri-negri.

When Sultan Mohammed Caliudin died in July, 1845, the preceding political order degenerated. Some of the prominent men schemed to usurp power, and the seven year old heir to the throne, Sultan Mohammed Soleiman Adil Chalifatul Mumimin (1845-1899), became a pawn in their intrigues. The perdana-manteri (first great officer of state) became regent, but his regency resulted in wide-spread anarchy and lawlessness: criminals were no longer prosecuted, robbery and arson were a daily occurrence and were employed as a recognized means of existence by the followers of princes and lords. Pirates from Balingingi, Tongka, and Tarakan plagued the east coast and the slave trade flourished.

When J. Zwager was installed in 1853 as Assistant-Resident in Samarinda, the manteri-negri informed him in an unanimous declaration that they were powerless to end the prevailing anarchy because they had neither the soldiers nor other means to do so. They speculated on receiving such means from the Dutch. During this period the people of Samarinda repeatedly took up arms to defend and avenge themselves. They formed their own council, composed of the Pau Adu (chief of police), the Sjahbandar (port master) and the Imam (for religious cases). This council tried as well as it could to restore law and order. When the sultan came of age, the Dutch government in 1863 signed a treaty with him wherein the sultan and his officers declared that the kingdom of Kutai was a part of the Dutch East Indies, subject to the Netherlands, and belonged to the Sultan only as a fief. The authority of the Dutch became in this way more official and concrete, and at the same time peace and order were restored.

When a sultan dies, his oldest (legitimate) son, the Pangeran Ratu, succeeds to the throne. When the heir to the throne is underage than the other brother of the deceased king is named regent with the title Pangeran Mangku Putra. In the event that the deceased monarch has no brothers, the great officers of the state act in common as regent (patih) and assume the title of Mangku Sukma. Where the oldest son of the sultan is a child of a concubine, and not of the sultana, he becomes Putra Sukma, never Pangeran Ratu (since he is ineligible for the throne).

For a long time the Buginese enjoyed a singular status in Kutai. Coming from Celebes, they established themselves around 1700 in what is now Samarinda, spreading later through all of Kutai. During the 18th century, and even later, they occupied a virtually autonomous position and were subject to their own Pau Adu, elected by the kepala manang or heads of the important Buginese families of state. However, the man elected could be vetoed by the sultan and new
elections called. The sultan bestowed pompous titles on the Buginese as a means of securing their loyalty and this was instrumental in their gradual assimilation (ca. 1860).

Titles were always rather cheap in Kutai, but the 19th century saw such an indiscriminate awarding of them that their prestige became grossly devaluated. There were hardly any standards or norms for the awarding of lower titles. The most important titles were: tumenggung, raden, demang, kiahi. The pembekels, or village heads, were given titles commensurate to their services or years in office. Village chiefs received no salary, but since 1903 were allowed to keep for themselves 8% of the head taxes collected in their area. Dayak and Malay villages had hereditary adat-heads, recognized or appointed by the sultan at a ceremony in which they were given Malay titles. The headmen of new kampongs were appointed by the sultan taking into account the wishes of the people. Only in the 1930's did it become customary for regular meetings to be called by the sultan at which the country's problems were discussed by native and Dutch civil servants together.

The headman's task was mainly that of upholding local adat. Freemen influenced the course of village affairs by pronouncing their opinions at consultations with the village head. This was also the case in Dayak villages, where, in fact, the community was generally ruled by an assembly of village men. The headman had a few real means of power; it was more a question of his persuasiveness and prestige. Neither was he entitled to act on his own in the name of the village; the community was responsible and liable as a whole.

With the breakdown of tribal homogeneity, the power of the village headman was further curtailed. The functions which were main-springs of his power, such as the administration of justice, were gradually usurped by the government. The village chief was thus gradually reduced to the role of executor of the government's orders, and he was no longer a real representative of his people.

Due to these changes there was little interest in the list of candidates for the office of village headman. In order to counteract the obvious disadvantages resulting from this indifference the government, and sometimes the sultan, resorted to the appointment of so-called adat-heads. But their jurisdictional districts were no longer communities in the sense of sharing common adat but were merely administrative districts. This institution therefore proved no help in bridging the gap.

In Kutai, in former times, judgments were pronounced in accordance with the adat book of laws, Beradja Nanti, by the courts at Tenggarong, Samarinda, and Kota Bangun. The chairman and the members of these courts were appointed and dismissed by the sultan. The Beradja Nanti mentions, in addition, the desirability of consultations with the manteri-negri, without which, it is said, the sultan cannot reign fruitfully. The sultans have followed this
counsel conscientiously, especially in the 20th century. There seems to have been yet a second book of laws in use, namely one for the aristocracy, in which the penalties prescribed were milder than in the Beradja Nanti. This book of laws fell into disuse as increasingly the laws of the Dutch East Indies were applied to Kutai.

BRUNEI AND THE BAJAU

D. E. Brown

Magellan's ships sailed through the southern Philippines and on to Brunei in the early part of the 16th century. Pigafetta, who chronicled the voyage, and later Spanish observers make it clear that many parts of the southern Philippines were under the hegemony of, or in alliance with, Brunei. When the Spaniards began to colonize the Philippines, a long period of confrontation between the Spaniards and the Muslim peoples of the southern Philippines and Borneo was initiated. The records of those events provide sound evidence that the "sea nomads" of the southern Philippines--such as the Bajau--remained subject to Brunei until near the end of the 17th century. Later on, certainly by the 19th century, the sea nomads of the southern Philippines were generally identified as subjects of Sulu or other southern Philippine sultanates. Moreover, the sea nomads had even become the scourge of their erstwhile rulers, the Bruneis. How did this shift of allegiance come about, and what was its significance? In this short paper I hope to cite sufficient evidence to show that the events and conditions outlined above did in fact obtain. I also hope to point to some of the possible answers as to how the shift occurred and to assess the theoretical significance of the shift.

Brunei's sphere of influence in the southern Philippines in the 16th century has been very amply documented, most notably in the Spanish records of their attacks on Brunei, Sulu and Mindanao in the 1570's (see especially Vol. IV of Blair and Robertson's The Philippine Islands). Although the Spaniards decided not to proceed with their plans to colonize Brunei, they none the less succeeded in breaking off a portion of its sphere of power. Sulu, for example, became an encomienda of the Spaniards. But this condition did not last long, and when Sulu succeeded in evading Spanish control, it seems also to have acquired considerable independence from Brunei. The sea nomads, though, did not immediately go over to the Sulus.

Who were these sea nomads? This is a problem that I must leave for persons more acquainted with distinctions among the sea nomads. But

in the one case where we have parallel Brunei-Spanish documentation on such peoples, the Spaniards refer to "Camucones" as the translation of the Brunei term, "Bajau" (an English summary of this interesting document is in Blair and Robertson XI:120-121; the original Brunei version is to be published by the Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka, Brunei). Since this document is dated 1599, we know that in an early period Bajau was one of the labels for sea nomads. So far as I know, it is the only term in use for these kinds of people by Bruneis today (I heard the term lanun frequently, but it meant "pirate" rather than an ethnic designation). Another term that the Spaniards used for sea nomads was "Lutao." This term tends to come into the records more prominently as time goes by, and is less associated with the Bruneis. Since the earlier term is Camucone, and since we have a sound linkage of this term with the Bajau, and since the Camucones are distinctly identified as subjects of Brunei, it is the relationship between the Bajau and Brunei that is the main concern here. (References to the Bajau being under Brunei control, or being associated with Brunei, or being the enemies of Sulu may be found in Blair and Robertson XVIII:79; XXII:95, 153; XXV:154; XXVII:299-300, 358; XXIX:35, 98; XXXV:124; XLI:322; XLIV:78.) The dates of these references run from about 1617 to about 1671.

As the Spanish records also demonstrate, the political importance of the sea nomads was very great. The Spaniards were forced to put considerable effort into the task of offsetting or containing the raids which the sea nomads conducted against them and their new subjects.

However, at about the time when we cease to find the Camucones referred to as Brunei subjects harassing the Spaniards, Brunei and Manila begin to regularize their relations. In the 1680's Manila and Brunei exchange ambassadorial visits, settle their mutual boundary on Palawan, and adjust some claims that stemmed from depredations by sea nomads and retaliations by Spaniards (Blair and Robertson XXXIX:190-191; XLI:190; XLII:183-184).

There were of course some Bajau still living in the Brunei parts of northern Borneo in the 19th century. But my impression is that if they owed any allegiance to Brunei, they were sedentary Bajau-speakers. The nomadic sea Bajau, or apparently the bulk of them, seem to have been quite firmly disassociated from Brunei by then. As trade relations between Manila and Brunei became increasingly normal or acceptable, neither end of the trade seemed to have the power to pacify the routes in between. An earlier, ascendant Brunei may have been able to control the turbulent sea nomads, but a rising Manila and a declining Brunei in combination were not sufficient. Sulu, and others, were behind, and profiting from, this interregional conflict, at least by the 18th and 19th centuries. But how and when did the Sulus get the Bajau to owe them allegiance? It is most unlikely that we shall find any precise record of such an apparently slow and amorphous process. But theoretical consideration, and suggestions provided by similar cases in the area, allow some speculations that could lead to further research and perhaps some conclusions.
On the theoretical side, an examination of the basic constitutional features of old Southeast Asian kingdoms will assist us in weighing the import of Brunei's loss of the Bajau. Those kingdoms took two basic forms, or a combination of the two. In one form a great number of wet rice farming communities—which were not organically united above the village level—were brought together by allegiance to a divine king. In the other form a great number of sea nomads—enjoying an utter minimum of organic interdependence—were similarly brought together by a divine kingship. Rice was the strategic resource of the first form, trade the resource of the latter. Burma and Thailand were examples of the first, while Srivijaya and Malacca were examples of the other. Majapahit and Brunei were more mixed. In Majapahit the dependence on rice may have been predominant, while in old Brunei the dependence on trade appears to have been dominant.

For the sake of argument, let us assume that Brunei was of the trading type. With a brisk trade, the Bajaus could be both employed and controlled; and with the Bajaus so employed, trade would flow in predictable and profitable channels for their employers or rulers. Spanish power was certainly great enough to break that circle, and if we don't know precisely what happened to the Bajaus, we do know that Brunei trade must have fallen off when the Spaniards began to assert themselves. If the Brunei trade declined, the Bajau should have been seeking a substitute for their former employment. It appears that they found it in harassing the Spanish dominions in the Philippines—at first as agents of Brunei. Later, however, they appear to have become the agents of others who, unlike the Bruneis, did not make peace with Manila.

O. W. Wolters' accounts of Srivijaya and Malacca suggest that the key element in attracting and controlling the sea nomads was wealth or treasure, in addition of course to divine kingship. In the case of Srivijaya and Malacca, an important source of this treasure was a secure trade arrangement with China. Brunei had itself once enjoyed these arrangements, the fruit of the international diplomacy of the Ming emperors. But the arrangements fell into some disuse in the later Ming period. What of the Ching period? In apparent confirmation of Wolters' thesis, the Bruneis are not mentioned as "tributaries" of China, while Sulu made no less than seven tributary missions beginning in 1726 (Fairbank and Teng's Ching Administration 156, 166-167, 170). Sulu had succeeded Brunei in cornering a profitable trade relation with China. Sulu, therefore, was more able to employ the Bajau. The Bajau went over to Sulu. At least there are strong indications to support this scenario (Anne Reber's unpublished master's thesis on Sulu history probably throws additional light on the whole problem, but it is not presently available to me).

The significance of the loss of the sea nomads is immediately apparent if we recall the form of the Brunei kingdom. Without its basic resource, Brunei was necessarily transformed toward the land-based end of the spectrum. But Brunei was located in a poor area for this kind of kingdom. The loss of the sea nomads necessitated Brunei's decline. Unrecorded though it be, the loss of the Bajau was a decisive "event" in Brunei history.
There are also larger problems here, but some of them fall quite directly in the lap of the historian: to what extent was the rise of Sulu and decline of Brunei a mere reflex of South China Sea diplomacy (rather than the consequences of the internal character of Brunei and Sulu)? Did Brunei's decline follow from a mistaken normalization of relations with Manila—which then turned out to be unprofitable? Manila certainly did not turn out to be a great trading emporium! And did Sulu's rise result from a fortunate refusal to normalize relations with Manila, which had the unexpected payoff of a favored status in China's eyes? If the historian can answer these questions, the social scientist could be a little more confident in assessing the consequences of Sulu's egalitarianism and Brunei's rigid sociopolitical hierarchies.

While the answers to the questions posed in this paper may be hard to find, I would expect that they would shed important light on the nature of society, the dynamics of inter-ethnic relations, and the role of external factors in the development of peoples who are normally studied by anthropologists addicted to an inside view.

SULU'S POLITICAL JURISDICTION OVER THE BAJAU LAUT

Clifford Sather*

European observers of the 18th and 19th centuries report that the various "Bajau/Samal" peoples of the southern Philippines were under the political jurisdiction of the Sulu Sultanate. Little is said, however, regarding the nature of this jurisdiction. What I shall try to do here is outline the system of political alliances by which the Bajau were linked to the Sulu polity. The system embraced considerable diversity, reflecting in part the social and political fragmentation of the Bajau themselves, and so I shall focus here on one particular group, the Bajau Laut, in order to show how the basic features of this system combined to determine external ties in a single, specific instance. The view presented is based primarily on material collected from living informants and refers to the mid- to late-19th century.

Perhaps the most serious problem bedeviling any discussion of political "jurisdiction" in Sulu is the fact that while the notion of territorial sovereignty was present, the state, as Kiefer has pointed out, was defined by reference to its center, not its geographical boundaries. Authority was strong only at the center and diminished rapidly as one moved outward. Consequently, claims of jurisdiction, while theoretically identical everywhere within the state, were effectively enforced only near its center.

* Clifford Sather is Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Vassar College and did field work among the Bajau Laut in the Semporna District of Sabah in 1964-1965.
This shading off of jurisdictional control was particularly evident in the case of the Bajau Laut, because, in contrast to most other Bajau-speaking groups, they lacked a single focus of settlement. Instead they were scattered in small enclaves throughout the entire Sulu Archipelago, and beyond as well. While they were bound everywhere to superordinate authorities by clientage relations, that seem to have differed little from one area of Sulu to another, the extent to which these relations actually linked them to the state varied greatly and in a way roughly proportional to their distance from its center.

At Jolo, and within the Tapul Island group generally, the Bajau Laut were joined directly as clients of the sultan's kinsmen or to families of other Tausug datu. At Lapak, for example, the Bajau Laut community that formerly anchored near the eastern shore of the island was traditionally a client dependency of the Tausug family that claimed the island as its political domain. Even now a special relation persists, and in the early 1960's members of this family, for example, made available a small piece of land near the present village of Siganggang for use by the Bajau Laut as the site of a government primary school.

In contrast, the political patrons of individual Bajau Laut villages in the Semporna area of Sabah, at the southern periphery of the state, and in the neighboring Sibutu Island group, were typically headmen of nearby shore settlements occupied by other, more sedentary Bajau groups. While each of these patrons were generally allied with more powerful leaders, some of whom were Tausug, claimed datu status or held appointed titles, the linkage provided by these relations to the larger Sulu polity was indirect and tenuous at best. Individual patrons enjoyed considerable independence and in no significant way acted as "political agents" of the Tausug state. For one thing, the clientage tie itself was only partly political and involved no clearly defined hierarchical relationship. In return for protecting their clients from harrassment, the patron and his followers enjoyed a privilege trading position and received fish and other marine products in exchange for craft goods, fruit, cassava, and other vegetable foodstuffs. Secondly, the relation itself was designed to serve the individual needs of its principals--not those of the state--and its continuance depended on the personality of the patron and his ability to provide protection and guarantee trade. Other than this, neither he nor his clients had formal duties towards the other.

Moreover, the relation itself could be severed by the client. However, a new protector was always sought, and no village was long without a patron and some were linked to several patrons, often through different village families. For the Bajau Laut a protector was viewed as essential not only in terms of trade but for physical security as well. Historically violence was an integral part of intercommunity relations in Sulu and by virtue of their clientage status the Bajau Laut were removed from the endemic conflict and feuding that went on among their neighbors in their competition for power and influence. In addition, a major responsibility of the patron was to protect his clients from raids and depredation directed...
against them by other outsiders. While the Bajau Laut were sometimes harrassed, and occasionally looted or taken captive in the past, the clientage system seems to have been fairly effective in this regard and resulted generally in a precarious stand-off. Although raids posed a constant threat to the equilibrium afforded by existing relations, the possibility of their occurrence was, by the same token, a major force binding the Bajau Laut to their patrons.

What is particularly interesting in this connection is that while physical violence was inherent in external political relations, its use, as a recognized means of control, was largely banished from intra-village politics. In this regard, it is essential, in discussing the Bajau Laut's position in the Sulu polity, to draw a sharp distinction between external and local-level politics (Swartz 1968), because each, in this case, involved a different set of political norms, attitudes towards authority, and notions regarding its legitimacy. Among the Bajau Laut, village headmen and other elders who had the task of settling disputes and safeguarding local adat owed their influence largely to their ability to conciliate, or disarm, potential disputants and bring to bear diffuse sanctions in such a way as to prevent overt physical violence from occurring. While they were not always successful in this, the legitimacy of employing physical coercion within the community was, nevertheless, denied, and the Bajau Laut, as a group, perceived of themselves, in contrast to their shore-oriented neighbors, particularly the Tausug, but also other Bajau, as a non-violent people who "fight only with their mouths."

Related more generally to the importance of violence in Sulu was almost certainly the unequal distribution of power and prestige within the state. The Tausug clearly enjoyed a privileged position vis-à-vis the Bajau. While not disputing Kiefer's thesis that violence was a central element in Tausug cultural values (1969), its relation to ethnic conflict calls for careful attention. Hostility toward the Tausug, as the politically dominant ethnic group, was, and still remains, very real in Sulu and was clearly kept in check by the use, or threat, of physical coercion. Significantly the one Bajau group to rival the Tausug in aggressiveness, the Balignini, enjoyed an independent political existence until reduced by the Spanish in the 19th century. However other factors, beside coercion, worked to prevent hostility from taking the form of an overt challenge to Tausug political interests. Perhaps the most important was the sultanate's very lack of centralization. Because of the loose interlocking of alliances, conflicts were readily contained, usually, in the case of the Bajau, at the lowest levels of the alliance structure, or within the peripheral units of the state where different ethnic groups could be allowed considerable autonomy without jeopardizing the authority of the sultan or others at the center of power. In addition Bajau leaders were themselves involved in the alliance system, so that conflicts tended to be expressed more in rebelliousness than revolution, with individuals seeking to increase their independence and power by manipulating, rather than rejecting, the
system and the prerogatives and symbols of authority that attached to it. Significantly enough in this regard, titles conferred in recognition of political influence continued to be granted by the sultanate to Bajau leaders in eastern Sabah as late as 1907--much to the chagrin of the Chartered Company (cf. Warren 1971:92)--and the importance accorded them, not to mention the employment of Tausu datu by the Company itself, attests to the continuing psychological hold which the sultanate still exercised over the Bajau even here at the geographical margin of the state down into the 20th century.

Moreover, the Bajau were so fragmented as to prevent them from ever acting in concert. Not only was the distinction between the "Tausug and "Bajau" based on political as well as ethnic criteria, but, equally important, internal differences within the Bajau population itself were also marked by differences in political relations. In contrast to other Bajau groups, the Bajau Laut lacked an internal political structure linking separate villages, and each settlement, as we have seen, was joined directly to a neighboring shore community. As a group, the Bajau Laut were thus identified with the status of political clientage and of all Bajau groups ranked lowest in terms of power and esteem.

Very generally the Bajau Laut formed a pariah class of landless fishermen and were traditionally held in considerable contempt by neighboring Bajau and Tausug groups. Patronage was frequently spoke of in terms of ownership, and Bajau Laut villages were said to "belong to" or be "the property of" the patron who provided them protection. In actuality, however, clientage appears to have been much more limited and reciprocal than this conventional view implied. Because of their despised social status, the Bajau Laut were separated from their neighbors by a caste-like social distance that limited all permanent ties to relations of mutual advantage. Moreover, clientage ties themselves were severable, and because of their mobility, Bajau Laut communities could usually escape individual relations they considered exploitative, and there were always rival political leaders to whom they could attach themselves. As a result patron-client ties were highly restricted in scope, brittle, and, from the perspective of the patron, almost impossible to enforce.

Finally, before concluding this outline of Sulu's jurisdictional claims over the Bajau Laut, brief mention must be made of Islam. The role played by Islam in the political life of Sulu was clearly of great importance. Majul (1965b), for example, argues that the legitimacy and power of the state depended upon the ability of the sultan to enforce an Islamic conception of centralized government against an earlier tradition of datu independence. In the case of the Bajau Laut the significance of Islam was rather different. In the eyes of their neighbors the Bajau Laut were seen as a pagan, non-Muslim people. This view owed something to their ecological circumstances; so long as the Bajau Laut lived permanently in boats they were unable to erect mosques or assume other outward signs of Islam. But there was also a significant element of coercion involved. Traditionally the Bajau Laut were physically debarred from coming ashore, except temporarily, and were not allowed to enter mosques or other religious structures or to build mosques of their own.
While ostensibly "religious," this prohibition had important political implications. The construction of a mosque signaled the emergence of a leader within a community capable of mobilizing its wealth and manpower and meant, as a consequence, an end to its clientage status. Despite efforts to prevent this from occurring, Bajau Laut communities did, in fact, move ashore in the past, and the final step in their loss of social stigma appears to have been the construction of a mosque and their acceptance by others as Muslims.

Thus the Tausug, and to a lesser extent other Bajau groups, actively opposed the Islamization of the Bajau Laut. While this particular situation may have been unique, and has changed with the spread of modernist religious reform, it is especially interesting in that it suggests that the spread of Islam in Sulu may have occurred as the byproduct of efforts to advance group political status. Rather than being fostered by those in power, Islam may have been adopted by subordinate groups, as it was in the past by individual Bajau Laut communities, as a way of inserting themselves actively into the political system. This, too, points up something else, namely, the close identity of ethnicity, religion, and political status in Sulu. By shedding their ethnic identity and adopting the outward signs of Islam, the Bajau Laut assumed a new status and altered their relations with other groups and with the state as a whole.

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN SABAH ON THE EVE OF CHARTERED COMPANY RULE

I. D. Black*

For the historian dealing in territories and peoples under European colonial rule, the perils of "Europocentrism" are well known. The records of the colonial rulers are indispensable but suspect at every turn in treating the colonized subjects and relations between rulers and ruled. Used warily, however, the records of the colonial process can provide such information about indigenous societies, yielding up a picture perceived only fragmentarily by the Europeans of the period.

It has been possible, primarily from the records of the British North Borneo Chartered Company, to reach some tentative conclusions about the political situation in Sabah during the implementation of Company rule. These conclusions do not always match the Company's simple picture of a land being liberated from the evils of Brunei and Sulu overlordship. My main concern has been with the societies of the interior (that is, in this context, those not reachable by navigable river, or on the upper reaches of the long

* I. D. Black is lecturer in Southeast Asian History at the University of New South Wales, Sydney. Dr. Black's principal research interest is in Sabah during the period of Chartered Company rule.
east coast rivers). Direct administration of such societies by European district officers was undertaken reluctantly, for reasons of expense. Control only came, in fact, and in almost every instance in the wake of disruption of these societies by non-European intruders acting under the Company's auspices--Muslim, Chinese and other traders, the Company's non-European police, notably Ibans, and a number of Muslim "Company chiefs," whose conception of their role as tax-collectors and dispensers of justice did not always coincide with that held naively by the Company.

The disruption took a variety of forms. In some cases societies were reduced from moderate prosperity to abject servitude. In others there was violent resistance to the intruders, which brought violent retribution from the Company. The "Murut" areas experienced severe culture shock, issuing in millenarian revolts, in 1891-2 in the areas around the head of the Padas gorge, and in 1915-7 in the "southern Murut" areas.

These reactions of the societies of the interior suggest strongly that they led virtually or completely autonomous existences as socio-political units before the advent of the Company. This is not to say that any of them had existed in total isolation quite out of touch with the outside world. The peoples of "the hill" had, however, been able to admit intruders from "the plain" largely on their own terms. Their defensive capacity was upset in the Company era because the intruders now came armed with European trade needs and goods, new sources of credit, and garbled but potent accounts of European customs and demands, the whole backed by the threat of European (and Iban, and Sikh) modes of warfare.

Such a thesis concerning the societies of the interior can be amply documented from the Company's records. It is much more difficult to obtain a picture of the peoples of the coastal plains and lower river reaches, either as regards their pre-European condition or their adjustment to the European presence. The following notes are therefore tentative. The coastal peoples were no more closely administered than the interior peoples, until after 1900, but also they required few of the police actions which deposited in the Company's records much information about the interior. The Company's early system of government, if "system" is an appropriate word, was less of a novelty to the coastal peoples than to those of the interior, and presumably the coastal peoples were in any case more sophisticated in dealing with novelty. They were therefore better able to avoid conflicts which would attract European attention.

These remarks apply particularly to the non-Muslim peoples of the west coast rivers, as far south as the Papar-Kimanis region. In the period immediately prior to the European arrival at least, these peoples appear to have maintained, largely on their own terms, a modus vivendi with the Muslim peoples. The self-determination of these groups was based on their capabilities as growers of wet rice, although their irregular, harassing forms of warfare were not without effect. Any idea that these groups were brutally oppressed by Brunei is not, on the whole, borne out by the Company's records.
Brunei authority, in fact, was little more than token in mid-nineteenth century Sabah, except, perhaps, on the rivers emptying into Brunei Bay. Brunei suzerainty was acknowledged as far north as the Temasuk region, but it was invoked when convenient by the "subject" peoples, rather than upheld by Bruneis. Further, the Brunei world-view, as described by Donald Brown (1969, n.d.), seems to have had little meaning for, or impact upon, the peoples of Sabah, Muslim or non-Muslim. This is understandable perhaps, for Brunei polity relegated these peoples to inconsequential positions.

The impact of Sulu upon Sabah in the same period stands in contrast. First, the authority of the Sulu sultanate was respected and feared, if also regularly flouted, along the entire east coast and far up the east coast rivers. Both in real terms and in terms of abstract but decision-determining loyalties the Sulu sultanate wielded influence. This influence declined in the 'eighties and 'nineties as much because of the Spanish drive against Sulu and the political chaos within the sultanate as because of the Company's advent.

Secondly, in reading Thomas Kiefer (n.d.) on Tausug polity, the student of Sabah is in a familiar world, as regards the social and political structures and attitudes of most of the Muslim peoples of Sabah, whether on the east coast or, interestingly, on the west. There is no evidence that the "Bajau" and "Illanun" peoples of the west coast acknowledged in this period the suzerainty of the Sulu sultanate, but certainly they shared, on the evidence of descriptions in the Company's records, many of the characteristics described by Kiefer. Mat Salleh, originally of the west coast river Inanam but leading revolts against the Company, district by district across Sabah, in the 'nineties belatedly illustrated the possibilities for a strong individual to mobilize support within this type of political framework. It is perhaps significant that he shunned Brunei, and Brunei shunned him, while Sulu relations with him were somewhat equivocal.

On the eve of the Company's takeover, in brief, Sabah lay (awkwardly for modern or western political comprehension) on the peripheries of the two sultanates, both of which defined themselves in terms of their centers rather than their geographical boundaries. The claims to suzerainty overlapped. In terms of real power, however, there was no overlap. Brunei's real power, either that of the sultan or his nobles, ceased beyond Brunei Bay; such Sulu power began at the Paitan, on the northeast coast. In the interior, because of geographical inaccessibility, and on the west coast because of economic strength, many non-Muslim groups maintained a state of virtual independence.

Amongst the Muslim groups of Sabah a world-view similar to that of the Tausug was the general rule, whether or not they acknowledged the authority of the Sulu sultanate. In this situation the Muslim groups of the west coast and of Marudu Bay perhaps saw it as valid to align themselves with either sultanate. The Brunei political order, if once it had been strong, had carried with it into Sabah less socio-cultural influence, certainly, than had that of Sulu.
This helps to explain why the Company met few difficulties in detaching former loyalties to Brunei, whereas the shadow of the Sulu sultanate persisted long in Sabah, and would have persisted strongly, had not the sultanate itself fallen into disarray.

**SOME NOTES ON SOCIOPOLITICAL CHANGE AMONG THE JAMA MAPUN**

Eric S. Cásiño*

One way of viewing sociopolitical change among the Jama Mapun of Cagayan de Sulu is by reference to the notion of differentiation. In traditional Jama Mapun society the distinction between politics and administration (Smith 1960) was not as fully made as it is today. What Smith (1960:33) says of lineage societies generally can be said to apply to the Jama Mapun polities in the past, say around the 1850's up to the American impact in 1900.

Thus in lineage societies, where political and administrative units are identical in composition and structure, segmentation is normally based on two principles only, localization and descent. In such societies, moral-religious values predominate and restrict the internal use of force, the legal system is relatively undifferentiated, the span of administrative coordination is typically narrow, the degree of internal equilibrium and integration are typically high, and there is little conscious concern for change.

In traditional Jama Mapun society the important political units were the district and the village under the administrative control of district chiefs and village headmen. The political office of chief or headman was not rigidly fixed in an overall administrative structure resembling the present administrative set-up of modern states. The office was looked upon as a function of the leading descent line (lungan) and was inherited through the male line. In addition much value was attached to the status distinction between nobles (datu, salip), and non-nobles and free men (tao marayao), and slaves (ata).

The district chiefs and village headmen exercised administrative functions while at the same time they engaged in politicking between themselves and over the pagan populations of Borneo and Palawan. Furthermore, in their administrative capacities they made use of no stable bureaucratic staff paid by state revenues. What they had were trusted followers and relatives whose remuneration was made in terms of kinship reciprocity.

When the Americans came a gradual differentiation between politics proper and administration proper began to emerge. The division into

---

villages and districts was rationalized by renaming all important settlements as barrios and placing all of them under a municipal structure in which the highest administrative office was that of a mayor. The first American act was a political act in which the occupying forces "pacified" the population by crushing all resistance and confiscating guns. This meant that the independent use of force, which was part of traditional politicking behavior, was removed from the traditional chiefs and headmen. There were two effects of this action. First, it made these local leaders into mediating functionaries of a new power imposed from above. Secondly, it implied a new mode of politicking through the election process.

Side by side with these changes in politics proper were changes in the administrative aspect of government. In the post-American era these two aspects were clearly distinguished. The present mayor of Cagayan de Sulu has a bureaucratic staff inherited from previous mayors whose members are paid with funds from provincial and national revenues.

Another important factor in modern sociopolitical behavior is religious identification—whether one is Muslim or Christian—which is in turn tied up with minority/majority relations. In Cagayan de Sulu where the population is predominantly Jama Mapun Muslims, politicking and administration are devoid of conflicting cultural values. But in Palawan where Jama Mapun immigrants are finding themselves mixed with an increasing number of Christian immigrants from Luzon and the Visayas, political behavior is more and more conditioned by ethno-religious considerations. It is in this latter situation where consciousness of Islam comes to the surface and enters the calculus of political relationships. Thus the barrio of Pulot in southeastern Palawan was in the process of being split into two, during the time of fieldwork in late 1969, along ethno-religious lines.

From the Jama Mapun data one can draw, it seems to me, two levels of analysis of political change. The first is where the contrast between datus/salis and the commoners is predominant. The second is where the contrast between Muslims and non-Muslims is seen as significant. The eclipse of the nobility among the Jama Mapun should not be taken as indicative of the loss of power throughout Mindanao and Sulu of this category of persons. The leaders of the secessionist movement in Mindanao who operate in the second level of Muslim/non-Muslim contrasts are themselves former nobles who are gradually reasserting their power. It would be interesting to see whether this pattern of datu reemergence will also recur among the Jama Mapun.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**

BRIEF COMMUNICATIONS

COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT AMONG THE BIDAYUH

Bouwe G. Grijpstra*

In 1971 the Department of Rural Sociology of the Tropics and Subtropics of the Agricultural University of Wageningen, the Netherlands extended its research program considerably. In various parts of the world, studies are being made of the social and economic position of small-scale farmers and their reactions to the development policies of their governments or specially created development authorities. The purpose of these studies is to make contributions to the general

* Ir. B. G. Grijpstra's address is: 141A Green Road, Kuching.
sociological knowledge of small-scaled farmers in developing countries. In such a way the theoretical framework on which development plans have to be based, will be improved and enlarged.

One of the countries where a study of one and a half years is being made is in Sarawak. The investigations are until now being carried out in the First Division, a good, accessible area around Kuching, the capital of Sarawak and seat of the various state government departments and other institutions in charge of the implementation of development plans. In the First Division the native people of Sarawak still practice a system of shifting cultivation which, now that the population is increasing progressively, does not provide them with a reasonable standard of living anymore. For the following reasons the Bidayuh in the Upper Sadong District were selected as location to start the study:

- largest group of the population in a mainly agricultural district;
- presence of many Chinese farmers who serve as an example to their Bidayuh colleagues;
- anthropological research already done in that district by Prof. Dr. W. R. Geddes in 1950.

During four months a community study was made in a kampong considered to be representative for the kampongs in the district. About 25 other kampongs were visited to see what variation exists in the characteristics of Bukar-Sadong kampongs. At the moment a questionnaire is in preparation to make a survey of all the Bidayuh kampongs in the Upper Sadong District (about 110). The topics which will be dealt with in this questionnaire are:

- the unity of kampong people and their internal cooperation;
- the external cooperation with the government in so-called "gotong-rojong" projects;
- the kind of leadership in the kampong;
- the influence of non-Bidayuh people;
- local entrepreneurship.

The guiding hypothesis in the drafting of the questionnaire is the development of a kampong as a whole, and the individual development of its inhabitants, is related to the unity of the kampong people. The study is made in full agreement with the State Government of Sarawak. The expenses are completely met by the Agricultural University of Wageningen, the Netherlands.
FORMATION OF THE SUMATRA RESEARCH COUNCIL AND THE FOUNDING OF THE BERITA KADJIAN SUMATERA (SUMATRA RESEARCH BULLETIN)*

From M. A. Jaspan
Director, Centre for South-East Asian Studies
University of Hull

It is surely ironic that in the last 30 years Sumatra, one of the most important culture areas of island South-East Asia, has merited less nurture of its regional arts and sciences than areas such as Malaya, Sarawak, Brunei or Sabah. The four latter all have important specialist journals and institutes concerned with their history, anthropology, arts and sciences. In the Dutch colonial period Sumatra had its own specialized scholarly and scientific institutions, among which one need only mention the Oost Sumatra Instituut, the Bataksch Instituut and the Zuid-Sumatra Instituut, apart from the Tobacco and Hevea Rubber Research Institutes in the Medan region. These institutes were internationally known; they issued reports, monographs and other serial publications of a high standard. It is unfortunate, though historically understandable, that this sizable area of scholarship was silenced by the Japanese Occupation, and until very recently has not been able to revive.

These and cognate problems have been in my mind for well over 15 years. In 1956, when supervising field research in Berastagi and Kabandjahe I discussed with Mr. (now Dr.) Masri Singarimbun and others the possibility of a Batak Karo Museum as a focal point for revived research. Likewise in the early 1960s the possibility of a Redjang Museum was discussed in Tjurup with Pasirahs A. Sani and Zainuddin. Despite their enthusiasm and blueprints such projects never got off the ground owing to a lack of funds, on the one hand, and to political instability on the other.

The small but important Museums at Pematang Siantar and Pa Lembang might also have served as focal points for a revival of regional studies in the arts, humanities and social sciences, but they too were plagued by chronic impecuniousness. Perhaps the only serious and partially successful attempt at a post-colonial revival of Sumatran Studies has been the Institute of Minangkabau Studies founded recently by Mr. Mochtar Na'im in association with Andalas University at Padang.

These and cognate problems were discussed with Professor Karl Pelzer, Director of the Southeast Asia Program at Yale University, during his visit to the Centre for South-East Asian Studies at Hull University in June 1971. As a result, we decided that the time was certainly ripe (and we hoped propitious too) for the establishment of a Sumatra Research Council. While the original conception shared much in common

* This communication is a somewhat shortened version of Professor Jaspan's "Introductory Note" to the first issue of the Berita Kadjian Sumatera-Sumatra Research Bulletin.
with the Borneo Research Council founded in 1969, the principal purposes of the SRC are at present:

(a) To act as a clearinghouse for information about scholarship, scholars and research relating to Sumatra;

(b) To delineate areas where new research or investigation are necessary, and to encourage such research.

Until further notice, and while expenses remain modest, the Centre for South-East Asian Studies at the University of Hull is prepared to coordinate the flow of communication and to issue BERITA KADJIAN SUMATERA (BERKAS).

Apart from a list of Members, the first issue of BERKAS publishes notes received from members, together with some bibliographies. Its principal substance, however, is a paper on the rantau phenomenon [Minangkabau voluntary migration] by Mr. Mochtar Na'Jim, who is currently on leave from Padang as a Research Fellow at the Institute for South-East Asian Studies in Singapore.

The Sumatra Research Bulletin is published twice yearly by the Sumatra Research Council, c/o the Centre for South-East Asian Studies, University of Hull, Hull, England, to which all enquiries and contributions for publication should be addressed.

---

RESEARCH INTO THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND BELIEF SYSTEMS OF THE IBAN AND RELATED PEOPLES OF WEST KALIMANTAN

From Victor T. King*

My main intention is to study Iban communities in the Sungai Embaloh and Sungai Palin, northern tributaries of the Kapuas River to the east of the Kapuas lakes area. In addition, I hope to carry out some research among the Maloh peoples who live in the same general area and who are related linguistically and culturally to the Iban. An important difference between them however, and an area of much-needed research in Borneo, is the Maloh ranking-system.

In the case of the Iban a study is needed of the social structure and ecological adaptation of more settled Iban longhouses. This would provide a sound basis for comparison with the situation as observed by Freeman during the period 1949-1958 among the Iban of the Baleh in Sarawak. Information on Iban religion and symbolism, centered around the system of augury, the padi cult and traditional medical practices will provide a useful addition to the material already collected on the Sarawak side.

Finally, what is needed for the Kapuas is a map showing the distribution of the variety of Dayak peoples here. A vital part of my

* Centre for South-East Asian Studies, University of Hull.
field-work program will be to investigate the migrations, fissions, boundaries and historical-cultural relations of Iban and some other Dayak groups.

RESEARCH ON THE TARSIER IN BORNEO

From Tom Harrisson

Much work has been done on the primates of Borneo, back to pioneer field studies by Coolidge, Carpenter and others early in this century; back indeed to Alfred Russel Wallace's murderous study of the orang-utan over a century ago. The smallest prosimians, such as the Tupaiidae (Tree-shrews) have had a fair amount of attention. But the extraordinary little Tarsier has been notably neglected, partly because it was thought to be rare and difficult to observe, since it is purely nocturnal. In the early sixties, T. and B. Harrisson showed it was easy to catch and keep Tarsiers under aviary conditions in Kuching and watch them all night under infrared light. Several papers were published describing these preliminary results. T.H. also demonstrated, by chance during an extensive bird-banding ecological study with mist-nets near Kuching, the Tarsiers were abundant not only in the old forest but also in secondary growth and even in cultivated rubber plantations. Working with Michael Fogden, biologist in East Africa, Tarsiers were marked with bird bands, very light aluminium numbered clips. Recovery showed that these did not hinder the animal in the wild, and gave entirely new information about distribution and movements. As this was only incidental to the ornithological work, it was not followed up. This elongate, far-leaping, beautiful, sometimes vicious creature remains virtually unknown in the wild.

Now, a graduate student from the Max Planck Institute, at Giessel, Frankfurt on Mein, West Germany, Mr. Carsten Niemitz, has received permission to work for approximately one year, in association with the Sarawak Museum, to continue work along the lines already mentioned and no doubt greatly extended with new approaches of his own. This should be one of the most interesting and unusual studies made in Borneo for a long time. And in view of the nature of the subject and it's very significant position in primate evolution, the results may prove to be of very great importance.

ANNOUNCEMENTS

ROUSSEAU TO EDIT A SPECIAL ISSUE OF THE SMJ

Jérôme Rousseau is editing a special issue of the Sarawak Museum Journal on the Kayan, Kenyah, Kajang, Kelabit, Punan, and other related groups of central Borneo. Those interested in collaborating
INFORMATION WANTED ON RECENT RESEARCH AMONG THE PUNAN AND BUKAT

We have heard from Jérôme Rousseau that a Swiss anthropologist spent several years in the interior of Borneo studying among other groups the nomadic Punan. Also, Rousseau writes that a researcher stayed for an extended period of field work among the Bukat (or Bukitan) of the Kapuas, where they form four longhouses. The Editor of the BRB would welcome information on these projects so that the researchers may be contacted.

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON ETHNIC GROUPS IN BORNEO,
THEIR DISTRIBUTION, AND DEMOGRAPHIC STATUS

Iwan Sewandono, of the Department of South and Southeast Asia, University of Amsterdam, Keizersgracht 397, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, is interested in contacting scholars who may have information on the number of ethnic groups in Borneo, their distribution, and demographic status. In particular he is interested in finding further information on the T'hoa. Those who have information on this subject should write Mr. Sewandono at his address above.

SPECIAL REPORTS SERIES OF THE CENTER FOR SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES, NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY

In 1969, the Center for Southeast Asian Studies began its monograph series, SPECIAL REPORTS. To this date five monographs have been issued, including David de Queljoe's A Preliminary Study of Malay/Indonesian Orthography (1969, 91 pages).

The Center is actively seeking new manuscripts for its series. Only manuscripts dealing with Southeast Asia will be considered. They may deal with a broad range of topics in the social sciences, humanities, and language. English translations of valuable Southeast Asian language sources and specialized, annotated bibliographies are also sought. Manuscripts outside this scope may be considered, in special instances, but the author is advised to correspond first with the Director before sending the material.

Manuscripts should not be shorter than 75 typed double-spaced pages or longer than 175 pages. Authors normally cannot be paid royalties since the SPECIAL REPORTS SERIES is subsidized by the Center. REPORTS will be copyrighted in the name of the Center.
SPECIAL REPORTS will be distributed by the Cellar Book Shop, P. O. Box 6, College Park Station, Detroit, Michigan. Individuals or institutions interested in placing standing orders for future REPORTS, or back issues, when in print, should write the Cellar Book Shop, not the Center for Southeast Asian Studies.

For additional information on SPECIAL REPORTS write Dr. Donn V. Hart, Director, Center for Southeast Asian Studies, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, Illinois 60115, U.S.A.

MONOGRAPH ON THE MUSLIM FILIPINOS IN PREPARATION

Peter G. Gowing is editing a monograph entitled The Muslim Filipinos: Studies in Their History, Society and Contemporary Problems. Publication is planned for 1972, and the contents will include the following chapters.

Introduction

Part One: The Past
1. The Muslims in the Philippines: An Historical Perspective
   Cesar A. Majul
2. Some Problems of Moro History and Political Organization
   Melvin Mednick
3. The Moro Wars
   F. Delor Angeles
4. Muslim-American Relations in the Philippines, 1899-1920
   Peter G. Gowing

Part Two: The Muslims of Sulu
5. Succession in the Old Sulu Sultanate
   Cesar A. Majul
6. Intergroup Relations Among the Tausug, Samals and Badjau of Sulu
   Richard L. Stone
7. The Tausug of Jolo and the Modern Philippines
   Thomas M. Kiefer
8. Institutionalized Friendship and Warfare Among the Tausug of Jolo
   Thomas M. Kiefer
9. Some Rites of Passage Among the Tausug of the Philippines
   J. Franklin Ewing, S.J.
10. Sisangat: A Sulu Fishing Community
    Dolores Ducommun
11. Child-rearing Among the Samal and Manubul, Siasi, Sulu
    Nena Eslao Benton
12. Folk-Islam in the Life Cycle of the Jama Mapun
    Eric Casiano

Part Three: The Muslims of Mindanao and Basilan
13. History of Maguindanao
    Najeeb M. Saleeby
14. Ethnic Stratification and Integration in Cotabato
    Chester L. Hunt
15. Maranao Social and Cultural Transition
    Mamitua Saber
16. Sultans and Mayors: The Relation of a National to an Indigenous Political System
    Melvin Mednick
17. The Maratabat of the Maranao
    Mamitua Saber, Mauyag M. Tamano and Charles K. Warringer
18. Maranao-Muslim Values: A Challenge to Education
   Rufino de los Santos

19. Features of Yakan Culture
   Inger Wulff

Part Four: Problems of Integration, Education and Modernization

20. Problems of the Muslims--A National Concern
   Mamintal A. Tamano

21. Education of the Muslims
   Antonio Isidro

22. Modernizing the Muslims
   Aluman C. Glang

23. How Muslim are the Muslim Filipinos?
   Peter G. Gowing

Bibliographic Survey of Recent Scholarship on Muslim Filipinos
   Peter G. Gowing

Index

SOUTH-EAST ASIAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY

The South-east Asian Journal of Sociology is published once a year by the Department of Sociology, University of Singapore, Bukit Timah, Singapore 10, Republic of Singapore. The editors of the journal are: Geoffrey Benjamin, Hans-Dieter Evers, Chan Kwai Choon, and Ranjana Suri. To date four volumes have been published. The annual subscription rate is US$3.00. Contents of the journal have included Donald Brown's "Social Stratification in Brunei," which has relevance for Bornean studies, as well as articles discussing suicide in Singapore, family planning attitudes in West Malaysia, love and courtship among Singapore Chinese, leadership and elite groups in Indonesia, etc.

BORNEO NEWS

Regional News

ERIC S. CASTÍNO as of January, 1972, has taken over the Curatorship of the Anthropology Division of the National Museum, Manila. Last August he presented a paper to the Twelfth Pacific Science Congress in Canberra entitled "The Coast-Inland Distinction: The Case of Brunei and Sulu."

TOM HARRISSON writes that he is very busy at Sussex University on the mass-observation project there. Further information on the mass-observation archives can be found in a recent article by Harrisson (1971) entitled "The Mass-observation Archive at Sussex University," Aslib Proceedings 25:398-411. Harrisson also writes
that he, however, is still spending part of every year in Borneo, and a good chunk of every year writing up Borneo material. He is writing a paper on the stone-age pottery of the Niah Caves, with special reference to the double-spouted vessels, which have never been published on. He recently was in Sabah for the official publication activities of his and Barbara Harrisson's book, The Prehistory of Sabah, which is now available from the Sabah Society, Kota Kinabalu. He also writes that during the Queen's visit to Brunei he showed the Queen around the Brunei Museum.

W. MARSCHALL has returned from his year in the U.S.A. and is now at the Volkerkundliches Institut, Der Universität, 74 Tübingen, Schloss West Germany.

RICHARD SHUTLER, JR., has moved from the University of Victoria to the Department of Anthropology, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa 52240, U.S.A.

R. O. WHYTE writes that he has recently spent two months working in the Library of the Botanic Gardens, Singapore, for an article on the archaeology, history, and taxonomic geography of the Gramineae, wild and cultivated, of Southeast Asia. He also was able to make a quick trip to Kuching to visit the Research Branch of the Department of Agriculture and their farms at Semongok and Tarat near Serian. In addition with the Conservator of Forests, Dr. J. A. R. Anderson, he made a visit to the peat reclamation plots outside of Kuching.

Kalimantan News

BIERTJE TJITRODIKOESOEMO of the Universitas Lambung Mangkurat, Banjarmasin, writes the Lembaga Pembinaan Hukum (Institute for the Promotion of National Law) is planning to undertake some research on land rights and inheritance in Central Borneo in 1972. He also writes that from his Faculty E. T. HASBULAH completed his studies for the degree of Sardjana Hukum (LLB) on his dissertation entitled "The Community and the Marriage-law of the Badjau (Bajau) tribe in Kota Baru" (1970); and SAFWAN SAHLUL will follow in the coming months with a dissertation on "Inheritance in Old Kotawaringin.

HERBERT AND PATRICIA WHITTIER have returned from field work in Kalimantan and are now at the Department of Anthropology, Michigan State University, where Mr. Whittier is writing up his dissertation on the social organization of Kenjah society.
Sarawak News

MR. AND MRS. ROBERT BLUST, Department of Linguistics, University of Hawaii, returned from field work in the Baram District, Sarawak, in November, 1971. He is currently engaged in writing his Ph.D. dissertation, entitled "Proto-North Sarawak and the Problem of Linguistic Subgroupings."

IAIN F. C. S. CLAYRE has returned to the Department of Linguistics, University of Edinburgh, 14 Buccleugh Place, Edinburgh EH8, Scotland, from linguistic field work in Sarawak. He writes that a series of notes of his dealing with events in the Oya River and surroundings, especially as they have bearing on Melanau history and language, have appeared in the Sarawak Gazette over the past year. For the present issue of the Sarawak Museum Journal, he has prepared a phonological statement of the Melanau language together with some accounts of the formalization of the writing system that he developed for the Sa'ban speech in the Baram Highlands. He writes that he is also working on an article dealing with the direction system in use among the Melanau. (An extended report by Clayre on the Melanau study project under the direction of H. S. MORRIS will appear in the next issue of the BRB.)

MICHAEL HEPELL, an Australian National University Research Scholar in Anthropology, is undertaking a study of Iban adat. Particular attention will be given to the relation between social behavior and the Iban adat system. In addition to field research, use will be made of archival material in the Sarawak Museum. Mr. Heppell's study began in August, 1971 and will extend over four years. His project is under the general supervision of DEREK FREEMAN, A. J. N. RICHARDS, and BENEDICT SANDIN. Anyone wishing to get in touch with Mr. Heppell may do so either through the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, Australian National University, Box 4, P.O., Canberra, A.C.T. 2600, Australia, or the Sarawak Museum, Kuching, Sarawak, from December, 1971 onwards. (Information received from Derek Freeman.)

ERIK JENSEN is currently making the final revisions of his book on the Iban which Oxford University Press is planning to publish. His new address is Chef de Cabinet, Office of the Director-General, Palais des Nations, CH-1211 Geneva 10.

PETER MULOK KEDIT writes that he has just completed his honours thesis at the Department of Anthropology and Sociology, University of Queensland. It is based on his study of Ibans living in the Skrang Land Development Scheme, which was undertaken when he was attached with the Sarawak Museum as a research trainee in 1968. He is returning to Sarawak briefly from November 1971 to March 1972 to do a survey of the process of modernization and problems of social change generally among the Iban, which will form the basis of his Master's dissertation.
CAROL RUBENSTEIN (B.A., Bennington College; M.A., John Hopkins University), an American poet who has given readings of her work in the U.S. and the U.K., was awarded a Ford Foundation Grant in November, 1971, to translate poems and chants of the indigenous peoples of Sarawak. Work is based at the Sarawak Museum and field work is planned for all five divisions of Sarawak.

DR. KARL SCHMIDT, of the South Pacific Commission, Noumea, New Calendonia, has recently been elected Member of the Royal College of Psychiatrists. He was also recently a Consultant for five weeks in India under the W.H.O. Program for Planning of Mental Health Services for India. PROFESSOR J. TONG, of the Department of Psychology, Guelph University, Guelph, Ontario, Canada, visited Dr. Schmidt to discuss the future of their researches in Sarawak and the preparation of their materials for publication (see bibliographical article in the next issue of BRB). Dr. Schmidt has also recently been appointed a Consultant Editor to the Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology.

I. M. SCOTT of the Soil Survey Division of the Department of Agriculture, Kuching, is engaged in research on the mapping and classification of soils in the central lowlands of Sarawak and the relationship of the present land-use pattern to the agricultural potential of the area.

VINSON H. SUTLIVE, JR. is returning to the U.S.A. in June to defend his dissertation on the Iban of the Sibu District and their immigration into Sibu, which was written for the Department of Anthropology, University of Pittsburgh.

UNA WAGNER is writing for her Swedish Licentiatexamen a dissertation on head-hunting among the Iban. She writes that her approach to this has been basically an ecological one in which head-hunting becomes a means of competition for control over scarce resources within an ecological niche. She is also dealing with the way in which head-hunting was abandoned by the Iban. Her address is: Socialantropologiska Institutionen, Stockholms Universitet, Fack, 104 05 Stockholm 50, Sweden.

Sabah News

JOHN E. D. FOX is writing up his research on the natural regeneration of the lowland dipterocarp forest, which was done in Sabah between 1966 and 1971. His work, supported by a grant from the U.K. Overseas Development Administration, is being done at the Forestry Department, University College of North Wales, Bangor.

JOHN F. ROBERTSON has moved to Australia where he has established the firm of J. F. Robertson and Associates, which consults on urban
planning, landscape architecture, urban studies, survey, and statistics. His new address is P. O. Box 1147, Gosford South, New South Wales 2250, Australia. He is continuing his research on cannon in Borneo and Malaya, and on his way to Australia he studied in Kota Bahru Chinese, European, and Malay cannon of varying periods. He plans to prepare a paper on the subject, and he writes that an article of his on Pigafetta will appear in the 1972 volume of the Brunei Museum Journal and another article on young brides among the peoples of Borneo appeared in the 1971 issue of the Journal.

Brunei News

COLIN CRISSWELL writes that his Ph.D. dissertation entitled The Establishment of a Residency in Brunei has recently been accepted by the University of Hong Kong. He has recently visited northern Borneo for a few weeks during the summer, making a familiarization trip in Sabah and then stopping at Brunei for a couple of days to visit the magnificent new Brunei Museum. He then continued on to Sarawak where he did some research in the archives of the Sarawak Museum with one result being the preparation of an article on tulin and sovereign rights in Brunei which is to appear in a forthcoming edition of the Journal of Oriental Studies.

LINDA KIMBALL, of the Department of Anthropology, Ohio State University, returned in late 1971 from field work in Brunei.

ALLEN MAXWELL has returned to Yale University from Brunei and is writing his dissertation, which is provisionally entitled "Kadayan Orientation: Time and Space in Northern Borneo." His new address is 51 Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, Connecticut 06521, U.S.A.

FELLOWS OF THE BORNEO RESEARCH COUNCIL: ADDENDA*

Baillie, Ian, Forest Dept., Kuching, Sarawak, Malaysia (Soil Survey; Plant Ecology).
Cockburn, Peter Francis, Forest Dept., P. O. Box 1407, Sandakan, Sabah, Malaysia (Forest Botany).
Court, Christopher A. F., 17/1 Soi Saensuk, Patiphat Road, Bangkok, Thailand (Linguistics with special interest in Southeast Asian Languages).
Court, Patricia, address same as above (Ethnomusicology).

* See the BRB Vol. 3, No. 1, for the original list.
Fitzgerald, Prof. Denis P., Dept. of Geography, Carleton U., Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6, Canada (Geography).
Freeman, Dr. Derek, Dept. of Anthropology, Institute of Advanced Studies, Australian National U., Box 4, P.O., Canberra, A.C.T. 2600, Australia (Anthropology and Human Ecology).
Grijpstra, Ir. Bouwe G., 141 C Green Road, Kuching, Sarawak, Malaysia (Rural Sociology of the Tropics and Subtropics).
Hepburn, A. J., Senior Research Officer, P. O. Box 1407, Sandakan, Sabah, Malaysia (Forestry Research).
Johnston, D. C., Dept. of Geography, U. of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand (Geography).
Kedit, Peter M., Dept. of Anthropology and Sociology, U. of Queenslan St. Lucia, Brisbane 4067, Australia.
King, Dr. F. Wayne, Curator of Herpetology and Chairman of Educationa Programs, New York Zoological Society, 185th Street and Southern Boulevard, Bronx, New York 10460, U.S.A. (Ecology; Herpetology; Animal Behavior).
Leigh, Dr. Michael B., Waterfall, N.S.W. 2507, Australia (Government, Sarawak).
Liew That Chim, Forest Ecologist, Forest Research Branch, P. O. Box 1407, Sandakan, Sabah, Malaysia (Forest Ecology).
Lockard, Craig A., 717 South Hamilton Street, Georgetown, Kentucky 40324, U.S.A. (History, Southeast Asian).
Pulunin, Dr. Ivan, Dept. of Social Medicine, U. of Singapore, Singapore 3.
Pringle, Dr. Robert M., Second Secretary, U.S. Embassy Djakarta, APO San Francisco, California 93656, U.S.A. (Southeast Asian History).
Robertson, John F., P. O. Box 1147, Gosford South, N.S.W. 2250, Australia.
Schwenk, Rev. Richard L., Methodist Agricultural Extension Service, P. O. Box 44, Kapit, Sarawak, Malaysia (Development Sociology and Agricultural Extension Education as it applies specifically to Iban Long House Dwellers).
Smythies, B. E., San Diego, Apartado 3 Estepona, Prov. de Malaga, Spain (Botany; Ornithology, Forest Research).
Somadikarta, Dr. S., Museum Zoologicum Bogoriense, Bogor, Indonesia (Ornithology).
Supardi, Ir., Lecturer, Agricultural Faculty of Lambung Mangkurat U., Djl. UNLAM 1/3, Bandjarbaru, Kalimantan Selatan, Indonesia (Agronomy and Agricultural Economics).
Sutlive, Vinson H., Jr., Methodist Theological School, P. O. Box 78, Sibu, Sarawak, Malaysia (Cultural Anthropology).
Sutlive, Mrs. Vinson H., Jr., address same as above.
Szanton, Dr. David L., The Ford Foundation, MCC, P. O. Box 740, Makati, Rizal, Philippines D-700 (Anthropology).

**RECENT CONTRIBUTIONS RECEIVED**

The BRC would like to thank the following individuals for their contributions towards the publication of the **BRB** and other expenses of the BRC.

I. C. Baillie; Mr. and Mrs. Christopher A. F. Court; The Rev. J. Andrew Fowler; Shiro Saito; Mr. and Mrs. Vinson H. Sutlive, Jr.; John O. Sutter; and T. Watabe.

**THE BORNEO RESEARCH COUNCIL (Continued from page 44)**

of Art; Human Ecology; Linguistics; Medicine; Medical Anthropology; Museology; Natural History; Pedology; Political Science; Prehistory; Primatology; Psychiatry; Social Anthropology; Sociology; Wildlife Management.

The privileges of Fellow include (1) participation in the organization and activities of the Council; (2) right to form committees of Fellows to deal with special research problems or interests; (3) support of the Council's program of furthering research in the social, biological, and medical sciences in Borneo; (4) subscription to the Borneo Research Bulletin.

The Fellows of the Council serve as a pool of knowledge and expertise on Borneo matters which may be drawn upon to deal with specific problems both in the field of research and in the practical application of scientific knowledge.

Fellowship in the Council is by invitation, and enquiries are welcomed in this regard.

**The Borneo Research Bulletin**

As part of its program to further research in Borneo, the Borneo Research Council publishes the Borneo Research Bulletin twice a year in June and December. The first volume appeared in 1969.

The Board of Editors of the Bulletin include: G. N. Appell, Editor; S. S. Bedlington; Tom Harrisson; A. B. Hudson; Robert F. Inger; H. S. Morris; and C. A. Sather. We would be glad to welcome anyone to the Board who would like to contribute his time and energies towards publishing the **BRB** and improving its coverage of Borneo research.

The **BRB** is currently received by 391 individuals; 107 government departments; 56 libraries; 15 foundations; and 40 other institutions
and concerns, for a total distribution of 609 copies. The distribution of the BRB includes: 20 in Brunei; 131 Malaysia (including 62 in Sabah and 52 in Sarawak); 63 Indonesia (including 39 in Kalimantan); 33 Australia; 170 U.S.A.; 69 United Kingdom; 5 Japan; 11 Netherlands; 100 to various other countries.

Subscription rates for the BRB are as follows: Institutions, commercial concerns and libraries, US$5.00; for individuals the subscription rate is based on place of residence according to the following scale: Australia, A$2.50; Belgium, B.Fr. 120; Canada, $4; Czechoslovakia, No Charge; Denmark, D.Kr. 15; France, N.F. 12; Germany, D.M. 10; Hong Kong, H.K. $16; Israel, I.£6; Japan, Yen 500; Netherlands, Fl. 10; New Zealand, NZ$2; Portugal, Esc. 60; South Asia, No Charge; Southeast Asia, No Charge; Spain, No Charge; Switzerland, S.Fr. 12; U.S.S.R., Rs. 4; United Kingdom, £1; U.S.A., $4.

INFORMATION FOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THE BORNEO RESEARCH BULLETIN

Research Notes: These should be concerned with a summary of research on a particular subject or geographical area; the results of recent research; a review of the literature; analyses of state of research; and so forth. Research Notes differ from other contributions in that the material covered should be based on original research or the use of judgement, experience and personal knowledge on the part of the author in the preparation of the material so that an original conclusion is reached.

Brief Communications: These differ from the foregoing in that no original conclusions are drawn nor any data included based on original research. They also differ in consisting primarily of a statement of research intentions or a summary of news, either derived from private sources or summarized from items appearing in other places that may not be readily accessible to the readers of the Bulletin but which have an interest and relevance for them. They will be included with the contributor's name in parentheses following the item to indicate the source. Summaries of news longer than one or two paragraphs will appear with the contributor's name under the title and prefaced by "From."

Bibliographic Section: A bibliography of recent publications will appear in each issue of the Bulletin, and, consequently, reprints or other notices of recent publications would be gratefully received by the Editor.

Other Items: Personal news, brief summaries of research activities, recent publications, and other brief items will appear without the source specifically indicated. The Editor urges those contributing such news items to send them in the form and style in which the contributor wishes them to appear rather than leaving this to the discretion of the Editor.

All contributions should be sent to the Editor, Borneo Research Bulletin, Phillips, Maine 04966, U.S.A.
STYLE FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Please submit all contributions double spaced. Research Notes and Brief Communications should be limited to approximately eight double-spaced pages. Footnotes are to be avoided wherever possible. Bibliographies should be listed alphabetically by author at the end of contributions; author should appear on a separate line, then date, title of article, journal, volume number, and pages. For books include place of publication and finally publisher. References in the body of contributions should be cited by author's last name, date, and page numbers as follows: (Smith 1950:36-41). For punctuation and capitalization refer to Bibliographic Section.

Names mentioned in the News Section and other uncredited contributions will be capitalized and underlined.